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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SPRINT/UNITED 
MANAGEMENT COMPANY V. MENDELSOHN: A 
REPLY TO PROFESSORS GREGORY AND 
SECUNDA 
By Mitchell H. Rubinstein* 
Professors Gregory and Secunda and I are all interested to see what 
impact Sprint/United Management Company v. Mendelsohn1 will have on 
the admissibility of ―me too‖ evidence in employment discrimination litiga-
tion, and in particular, comparative evidence from another employee of the 
defendant-employer who did not share the plaintiff‘s supervisor, but was af-
fected by a similar type of adverse employment action—such as the reduc-
tion in force (and accompanying layoffs) at issue in Sprint.  Professor 
Gregory and I predict that Sprint will result in much more litigation over 
this issue of admissibility,2 while Professor Secunda remains skeptical that 
Sprint will have much of an impact at all.3 
Professor Gregory‘s essay highlights the central problem in employ-
ment discrimination jurisprudence today—proving or disproving claims of 
harassment with only circumstantial evidence.  Discussing sexual harass-
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1
  128 S.Ct. 1140 (2008) (link). 
2
  See David L. Gregory, Sprint/United Management Company v. Mendelsohn and Case-by-Case 
Adjudication of “Me Too” Evidence of Discrimination, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 382 (2008) 
(link); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn: The Supreme Court Ap-
pears To Have Punted On the Admissibility of “Me Too” Evidence of Discrimination. But Did It?, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 264 (2008) (link). 
3
  See Paul M. Secunda, The Many Mendelsohn “Me Too” Missteps: An Alliterative Response To 
Professor Rubinstein, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 374, 379–80 (2008) (link). 
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more than ―‗he said, she said‘ debate[s].‖4  He goes on to compare ―he said, 
she said‖ with ―me too‖ cases and postulates that while the admission of 
―me too‖ evidence will provide more support for claims of harassment, one 
result of Sprint may be that litigants will attempt to present an endless line 
of ―me too‖ witnesses.5  Professor Gregory does not opine on what Sprint 
means with regard to the actual admissibility of ―me too‖ evidence; instead 
he simply concludes that this will be left ―to the pragmatic wisdom of trial 
court judges.‖6 
Professor Secunda, however, disagrees with my assessment that Sprint 
will significantly impact employment discrimination jurisprudence.  As I 
explained in my principle essay, while Professor Secunda and others view 
the Supreme Court‘s decision as a ―judicial punt‖ because the Court re-
manded the issue of the admissibility of ―me too‖ evidence, the reality is 
that the Court did more than just punt.7  I argued that by refusing to hold 
that the remote evidence presented in Sprint was inadmissible, the Court 
implied that it may be admissible.  Given the remoteness of the evidence in 
question, Sprint may have set the bar for the admission of ―me too‖ evi-
dence very low.8 
Professor Secunda opines that the Court had to punt because eviden-
tiary determinations are for lower courts to make.9  He goes on to claim that 
clear rules are not desirable in this area of law, reasoning that ―relevance‖ 
and ―prejudice‖ under the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 401 and 403 are 
not amenable to broad per se rules.10 
Professor Secunda is mistaken on both counts.  The Court was under 
no obligation to punt, and I strongly disagree with Professor Secunda‘s 
statement about the lack of a need for clear rules in this area of law.  Clear 
evidentiary rules are desirable in employment discrimination (and, for that 
matter, in all other areas of law).  Unclear evidentiary rules foster hostility 





  Gregory, supra note 2, at 383. 
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  See id. at 383–85. 
6
  Id. at 386. 
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  See Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 266–67 & n.18. 
8
  See Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 272–73.  But see Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Em-
ployment Discrimination After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 365–68 (2008) 
(arguing that the Court‘s limited holding in Sprint ―leaves plenty of room‖ for lower courts to refuse to 
admit ―me too‖ evidence when the proffered witness did not work under the same supervisor as the 
plaintiff) (link). 
9
  Secunda, supra note 3, at 376–77. 
10
  Id. at 381 (―Relevance and prejudice under Rules 401 and 403 are determined in the context of 
the facts and arguments in a particular case, and thus are generally not amendable to broad per se 
rules.‖). 
11
  The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that there is a need for clarity in the law. See, e.g., 
Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 510 (1993) (stating that creating different rules for novel facts 
would generate uncertainty and expensive litigation) (citing Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 679 
(1965) (link); cf. Upjohn v. United States., 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) (in discussing law of attorney-
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rules regarding admissibility of evidence are not appropriate given the im-
portance of context in determining relevance and prejudice under FRE 401 
and 403.  My contention is merely that the Court should have supplied a set 
of criteria to be considered by lower courts when making determinations on 
the admissibility of ―me too‖ evidence. 
Professor Secunda‘s view that the Court incorrectly granted certiorari 
is also unfounded.12  I do not find any support for his argument that the 
Court made a mistake, and I believe that he reads too much into what he 
admits are oral argument tea leaves.13  As I demonstrated in my principle 
essay, the state of the law was in complete disarray prior to Sprint being 
granted review.14  For this reason, the Supreme Court was well advised to 
review this important issue. 
Unfortunately, the Court did not take advantage of this chance to deci-
sively settle the issue.  My primary disappointment with the Sprint decision 
is its failure to set forth any criteria to guide the lower courts in making fu-
ture determinations.  The Court could have instructed lower courts to con-
sider a specific set of criteria selected from a variety of potentially relevant 
factors, including the size of the company; whether different work locations 
were involved; whether the comparative witness interacted with either the 
plaintiff or the defendant-decisionmaker; the respective time frames of the 
comparative witness‘s observations and the adverse employment action al-
leged by the plaintiff; whether the purported ―me too‖ evidence is the only 
evidence presented; whether the defendant-decisionmaker had any input in-
to decisions affecting the comparative witness; and the background, educa-
tion and experience of the comparative witness compared to that of the 
plaintiff.15  The list need not be exhaustive.16 
The Court, however, was correct in issuing a remand.17  Evidentiary 
                                                                                                                           
client privilege the Court states that an uncertain privilege is little better than no privilege) (link). 
12
  Secunda, supra note 3, at 380 (―[T]his was an appropriate punt because somewhere along the line 
the Court recognized its misstep in granting certiorari in the first place.‖). 
13
  See id. at 378 n.28. 
14
  Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 265, 267–69 (discussing the state of the law leading up to the Sprint 
decision). 
15
  Indeed, courts hearing employment discrimination cases have already recognized the relevance of 
many of the criteria proposed above.  See, e.g., Elion v. Jackson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(admitting testimony from a ―me too‖ witness in support of the defendant-employer because the witness 
was of the same sex as the plaintiff and was promoted and given additional responsibilities during the 
time of the alleged discrimination); Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th 
Cir. 2006), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 1140 (2008) (stating that termination of older workers within one year as 
part of an ongoing company-wide reduction in force was logically tied to the decision to terminate plain-
tiff and, therefore, ―me too‖ evidence was relevant and admissible); Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting 
Co. Inc., 347 F.3d 515, 524–25 (3d Cir. 2003) (in permitting the introduction of employer evidence of 
favorable treatment of other employees the court examines the time frame involved and whether differ-
ent circumstances were involved). 
16
  See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 636 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that there is no ―magic 
formula for determining whether someone is similarly situated‖). 
17
  While I recognize that if the Court had established criteria to review in ―me too‖ cases, it might 
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determinations are indeed for lower courts to make in the first instance.  
However, that should not have prevented the Court from offering at least 
some guidance on the admissibility of ―me too‖ evidence.18 
As Professor Gregory and I both noted, post-Sprint lower courts are al-
ready divided over how to treat ―me too‖ evidence.19  The Court must take 




                                                                                                                           
be considered ―dicta,‖ the reality is that many courts would find such dicta quite persuasive.  See McCoy 
v. MIT, 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 115, 120 n.8 
(7th Cir. 1989) (appellate courts ―should respect considered Supreme Court dicta‖)). 
18
  In other contexts, the Supreme Court has, of course, provided lower courts with guidance in in-
terpreting the law.  See, e.g., Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 100 (1978) 
(setting forth factors that are relevant for determining what process is due under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (noting several relevant factors courts should consider in de-
termining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute which does not expressly provide for one) 
(link). 
19
  Gregory, supra note 2, at 382–83; Rubinstein, supra note 2, at 274 n.55.  
